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In the contemporary issue of  same-sex marriage within the United 
Methodist Church, the Jerusalem Council’s decision-making process to 
include Gentiles in Acts 15 has been appealed to as a model for the church 
to	redefine	and	reshape	its	current	interpretation	of 	scripture.	This	article	
demonstrates how the hermeneutical approach of  the Jerusalem Council, 
which made use of  Old Testament understandings of  Torah-authority, 
especially	 using	 Leviticus	 17-18,	 did	 not	 aim	 to	 redefine	 or	 change	 the	
meaning of  the Torah, but to use it for guidance and direction. Applying 
such a method to the current issue of  same-sex marriage would be 
incompatible with this hermeneutical decision-making process of  the early 
Church.
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“To require of  Gentile Christians obedience 
only to the four commandments which the 
Law itself  imposes on them is not to set aside 
the authority of  the Law but to uphold it.”1
The United Methodist Church is deeply divided over same-
sex practices. Church trials for ministers who have performed same-sex 
weddings against the express intent of  church discipline and polity threaten 
to tear the church apart. Bishop Sally Dyck offered the following comments 
last November to members of  her annual conference. 
In	Acts	15,	the	early	church	found	itself 	in	a	conflict	over	
the law as well as accepted and deeply held assumptions 
and traditions about who people are (circumcised or 
uncircumcised). It was a visceral reaction by some 
against Paul and others who were reaching out to the 
(uncircumcised) Gentiles. They stood on the side of  
the law but the church found a way to be together that 
seemed to work. I don’t think it changed all the hearts 
and minds of  the Jewish Christians but at least it wasn’t 
impeding the outreach to the Gentiles. (Please read the 
chapter to see what they did and how they did it.) … I 
will be announcing in the near future some evening, open 
gatherings where we can discuss how we can reframe this 
conversation, based on Acts 15.2
Was the problem addressed by the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 “a 
conflict	over	the	law”	as	Bishop	Dyck	suggests?	Is	the	process	for	decision-
making in Acts 15 helpful for our current impasse? It has long ago been 
questioned	whether	the	analogy	with	first-century	Christians	in	Acts	15	is	
appropriate or pertinent enough to override all other factors in the debate.3 
Indeed, the analogy is prima facie dubious because the Jerusalem Council 
was considering the nature of  salvation itself  while the current debate is 
over	an	attempt	to	redefine	Christian	sexual	ethics.	Nevertheless,	because	
the Council has been used so frequently in recent discourse especially in 
the popular media, I turn to a fresh examination of  the details of  Acts 15 
in order to explore its message and possible contributions to the church’s 
current debate over same-sex practices. Has it been accurately used in the 
debate? If  not, what then are the lessons of  Acts 15 for today’s debates? 
In an article entitled “Welcoming in the Gentiles: A Biblical Model 
for Decision Making,” Sylvia C. Keesmaat traces a number of  dynamics 
involved in making the decision to include the Gentiles in the church.4 She 
concludes that “the central importance of  hospitality” drives the narrative, 
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providing the background for the kinds of  new friendships (such as Peter 
and Cornelius) making it possible for the Christian leadership in Jerusalem 
to hear each other and discern the voice of  the Holy Spirit. The result 
was a ruling against Pharisaic Christians who argued that circumcision was 
required for Gentile believers, even though their argument appeared to 
have both scripture and tradition on their side. Keesmaat relies heavily from 
time to time on the older work of  Luke Timothy Johnson, so my comments 
here will occasionally address his arguments as well.5
1. The Bible as Unfinished Drama or Unfinished Authority? 
Keesmaat begins by raising the question of  the nature of  the Bible 
and its authority (pages 30-34). Her answer acknowledges diverse genres in 
the Bible, but relies on her doctoral supervisor, Professor N. T. Wright, in 
asserting that scripture “comes to us overwhelmingly as a narrative” (31). 
She	emphasizes	that	the	narrative	is	“an	unfinished	drama,”	and	that	“we	
are in the middle of  it.” With Wright, Keesmaat avers that, in order to 
live faithfully in the drama, we Christians today need (a) to be faithful to 
the story that preceded us and (b) to be creative in our living of  the story. 
Christian	integrity	requires	both	fidelity	to	and	creativity	from	the	biblical	
drama. By the latter, Keesmaat means primarily the ability to discern how 
the biblical drama unfolds in new cultural situations, and in the light of  new 
workings of  the Holy Spirit. It is precisely this struggle for integrity that 
engaged the church at the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15. 
Of 	course,	Wright’s	“unfinished	drama”	 is	widely	accepted	and	
used today, and this is not the place to explore further its implications.6 For 
our purposes, it is enough to note here that Keesmaat simplistically equates 
the	unfinished	drama	with	an	unfinished	authority. What I mean by this is 
that she has assumed a position that Wright himself  has critiqued in J. D. 
G. Dunn’s approach; that is, as a “cavalier freedom” in the way Christians 
approach the text. Dunn argued that Jesus and Paul treated the Old 
Testament with a cavalier freedom, and so we are free to do the same with 
the New Testament. Wright objected that Dunn’s approach is anachronistic 
because	we	are	still	living	in	the	unfinished	drama	of 	the	New	Testament	
period, whereas Jesus and Paul were living in a different dispensation (for 
lack of  better word). He objects further that Dunn’s approach is simplistic 
because it fails to appreciate fully the foundations upon which Jesus and 
Paul reacted as they did to the Old Testament proscriptions, such as 
circumcision and food laws.7 I believe Wright’s criticisms of  Dunn are 
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correct, and should be applied here precisely to Keesmaat’s understanding 
of 	the	unfinished	drama	and	unfolding	authority	of 	the	Bible.	
The	description	of 	the	Bible	as	an	unfinished	drama	is	a	useful	
metaphor. But the degree to which we emphasize our creativity in 
continuing	 the	Bible	 as	 an	 unfinished	 authority	 for	 our	 day	 is	 open	 for	
critique. Clearly, when the church begins to consider itself  determinant in 
the process, creating a new authority that overturns scripture and tradition, 
one can raise an objection that the church has turned the Bible into nothing 
more than an historical witness to God’s redemptive activity in the past 
rather than an acting and living authority from that past to our present.8 
Before	moving	onto	the	specifics	of 	Keesmaat’s	treatment	of 	Acts	
15, I note further an irony in the way she explains how today’s Christians 
are to live into the Bible as our story. She turns to Deuteronomy 6:5-9 in a 
beautiful description of  the role of  the story of  the Bible in our lives. 
[E]very	moment	 of 	 every	 day	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 filled	
with Torah, with the story of  who God is and what God 
has	 done.	 This	 story	 fills	 your	 very	 being,	 so	 that	 you	
cannot help talking about it to your children at home and 
to everyone you meet, no matter where you are. When 
you are awake, you tell the story; when you are asleep, you 
even dream in its symbols and metaphors. It is on your 
hand, so that you see it enacted in all that you do, and on 
our forehead, so that others see it in all that you think and 
say. Your home and your life in the public square are to be 
shaped by it. … [W]e need intentionally to try to live out 
the narrative of  scripture in our personal and (perhaps 
more importantly) our communal lives as a precondition 
of  engaging in discussion of  any issue. (32)
Of  course, the only problem is that Deuteronomy 6:5-9 is not 
about a story. Ironically, this beautiful text is explaining the only logical 
and natural response any Israelite should make upon hearing the words 
of  the Shema: “Hear, O Israel, yhwh is our God, yhwh alone.” Her 
discussion has made the fundamental category mistake of  confusing Torah-
instruction with Torah-narrative. And the great irony of  this portion of  the 
discussion is that most agree today that the Shema is especially focused on 
the	first	of 	the	Ten	Commandments,	listed	in	the	previous	chapter	(Deut.	
5:7). This way of  explaining how our imagination should be shaped by 
the story, according to Keesmaat, is not about a story at all, but about 
legal instruction, which ironically, Keesmaat will argue no longer applies 
to modern Christians. And perhaps this also subtly critiques the pressing 
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of  any metaphor too far. Yes, the Old Testament is largely a narrative. Yet 
ancient Israelites would likely have found the idea that it can be reduced to 
a metanarrative to be reductionistic, especially as this may miss the intent 
of  “torah,” as we shall see.  
When it comes to bringing the biblical drama to culmination 
in Jesus, Keesmaat turns to Mark 10:32-45 to illustrate the way biblical 
authority has been transformed by Jesus. The story of  James’ and John’s 
lust for authority – as the Lord’s right- and left-hand commanders – is 
worldly authority, using violence and tyranny. But followers of  Jesus are 
to exercise a servant authority that lays down life for others. This, claims 
Keesmaat, is “the way the story comes to its climax” (33). 
The problem once again, however, is that Torah has been reduced 
to a story, and in this case, conveniently wrapped up in the disciples’ lust 
for power. But if  we understand “torah” as I believe the Bible itself  does 
ubiquitously, we would turn more naturally to the Sermon on the Mount. 
Here	is	where	we	learn	specifics	of 	the	way	Torah-authority	is	fulfilled	in	
Jesus.	Surely,	this	is	where	we	learn	that	Jesus	fulfills	the	Torah	rather	than	
abolishing it, and that not a single stroke of  the Torah will pass away until 
all is accomplished. Because of  Jesus, in fact, it is possible for believers to 
exceed the righteousness of  the scribes and Pharisees, although it remains 
for the rest of  the New Testament to explore how this is possible. 
Here I hope to have shown simply that there is a difference 
between	picking	up	and	continuing	the	unfinished	drama of  the Bible, on 
the	one	hand,	and	picking	up	and	continuing	the	unfinished	authority of  the 
Bible, on the other. Determinacy of  authority is the biblical canon itself, 
and not simply the church’s ability to discern new revelation from God. 
The church is to interpret, and at times it may discern new illumination. 
But	revelatory	authority	is	determined	first	by	the	text,	and	such	authority	
is	 particularly	 relevant	 where	 confirmed	 by	 the	 church’s	 tradition	 and	
teachings.9 
2. The Problem: The Origin of  the Conflict Addressed by the Jerusalem Council
Keesmaat	 next	 identifies	 the	 problem	 of 	 Acts	 15	 as	 one	 of 	
conflict	in	the	early	church	over	the	conversion	of 	the	Gentiles	(pages	34-
36).10 She begins by asserting that the demand for them to be circumcised – 
“according to the custom of  Moses” – was a way for Pharisaic Christians to 
ensure the Gentiles were leaving idolatry behind because it was essentially a 
commitment to keep the whole Torah (Acts 15:1 and 5). 
68     The Asbury Journal    69/2 (2014)
It might generally be objected that the presenting issue for the 
Council was whether Gentiles must come to Christianity through Judaism. 
More	specifically,	I	suggest	here	that	Keesmaat	has	rightly	identified	the	legal 
aspect of  Torah, but not the more general instructional nature of  Torah. And 
this objection to Keesmaat’s approach brings us immediately to the heart 
of  the disagreement about the way the Jerusalem Council is being used in 
the church today. In a word, it comes down to a common misunderstanding 
of  the word “torah” (tôrâ). Like the ancient Pharisaic Christians, many 
readers of  Acts 15 today have unfortunately perpetuated a narrow and 
reductionistic	understanding	of 	“law”	as	reflected	in	the	demand	itself:	“It	
is necessary for [the Gentiles] to be circumcised and ordered to keep the 
law (ton nomon) of  Moses” (Acts 15:1). 
It may seem a trite assertion to make here, and one that most 
beginning seminarians have learned, but I cannot emphasize enough the 
wide	 semantic	 field	 of 	 the	word	 tôrâ in the Old Testament itself. It has 
been argued, rightly in my view, that Deuteronomy’s use of  tôrâ	 reflects	
the term’s reservoir of  numerous semantic variations. As the ideological 
“center of  the Old Testament,” Deuteronomy’s nuances of  tôrâ illustrate 
the legal, prophetic, didactic, and sapiential elements of  the term, and set a 
trajectory	of 	a	rich	and	wide	semantic	field	of 	meanings	for	the	rest	of 	the	
Old Testament.11 Deuteronomy’s unifying use of  tôrâ led subsequently to 
its use for the Pentateuch itself  as Greek ho nomos, famously attested in the 
second century BCE in the prologue to Sirach, with its references to “the 
Law and the Prophets and the other books.”12 
Some have considered the Septuagint (LXX) the point in time 
when tôrâ became nomos, a purely nomistic understanding of  law, but I am 
not of  the opinion that this is the Septuagint’s fault.13 In that case, when did 
the overwhelmingly positive understanding of  tôrâ as didactic, life-giving, 
and life-sustaining blessing in the Old Testament come to be reduced to 
a	codified	 list	of 	 legally	binding	stipulations	or	nomos?14 The meaning of  
“law” in Second Temple Judaism and the New Testament is an exceedingly 
complex topic, far beyond the task I have set for this investigation. It is 
enough to say at this point that we must be careful not to place the blame 
for this reductionistic nomos at the feet of  the halakic tradition of  the 
Mishnah and Talmud, which traditions were surely only trying to be true 
to the tôrâ in the face of  Hellenism and the ethnic and political oppression 
of  the Diaspora. 
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           At the same time, it must be admitted that it is possible to miss or 
minimize the all-encompassing Deuteronomic tôrâ, while taking up instead 
the particularizing senses of  the Pentateuch’s priestly traditions on the way 
to a reductionistic nomos. While we may never be able to trace the transition 
in history from didactic tôrâ to nomistic tôrâ, it is clear that in the New 
Testament itself, both concepts are present.15 In any case, one cannot speak 
of  a comprehensive law versus gospel dichotomy in the New Testament 
(Matt 5:17) that culminates in a displacement of  the didactic tôrâ. Instead, 
the New Testament represents the coming of  Messiah as inaugurating an era 
that	renders	obsolete	any	misperceived	soteriological	benefits	of 	the	law.	In	
this way, the New Testament retrieves the Old Testament’s understanding 
that the law is not the means of  salvation, but its consequent blessings (just 
as Abraham was circumcised after his faith; Romans 4:9-12). 
In other words, the tension in the New Testament is not between 
its new saving grace and the Old Testament’s tôrâ, but between saving 
grace and the statutory and reductionistic appropriations of  nomos. And it 
is precisely here that I believe Keesmaat and others reading Acts 15 today 
have misdiagnosed the problem of  Acts 15. She is correct to point out 
that	 the	specific	 legal	 requirement	of 	circumcision	may	have	been	a	way	
of  ensuring that Gentiles would keep “the whole of  Torah” (36). But she 
has minimized the general instructional nature of  tôrâ, by accepting the 
soteriological reading of  the Judaizers and Pharisees, as stated in the initial 
objection that caused the crisis: “Unless you are circumcised according to 
the custom of  Moses, you cannot be saved” (Acts 15:1).16 They have reduced 
Moses to the nomistic traditions of  the priestly texts, while missing the 
didactic tôrâ of  the Old Testament itself. And Peter’s logic, which eventually 
won	the	confidence	of 	the	Jerusalem	Council,	is	a	direct	refutation	of 	their	
convictions. 
8 And	 God,	 who	 knows	 the	 human	 heart,	 testified	 to	
them by giving them the Holy Spirit, just as he did to us; 
9 and in cleansing their hearts by faith he has made no 
distinction between them and us. 10 Now therefore why 
are you putting God to the test by placing on the neck 
of  the disciples a yoke that neither our ancestors nor we 
have been able to bear? 11 On the contrary, we believe that 
we will be saved through the grace of  the Lord Jesus, just 
as they will. (Acts 15:8-11)
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The presenting problem before the Council was how to respond 
to a nomistic and soteriological understanding of  Moses, one that I 
believe is not supported by the Old Testament traditions themselves. Peter 
transcended	 the	 debate	 by	 focusing	on	 the	 definition	of 	 salvation	 itself,	
for both Gentiles and Jews (“…we will be saved…, just as they will”). The 
Gentiles are not saved by means of  keeping the nomos, and furthermore, 
neither are we Jews! Peter has rightly placed the didactic tôrâ over against 
the constraining nomos, just as the Pentateuch itself  sees the tôrâ coming 
subsequent to the saving acts of  the Ten Plagues, the crossing of  the Red 
Sea, and the covenant at Sinai. The Gentiles do not need to “keep the nomos 
of  Moses” (15:1) in order to be saved; rather, they have already been saved, 
and the question now is how the tôrâ of  Moses relates to them. It would 
never have occurred to Peter, Paul and Barnabas, James, or anyone else at 
the Jerusalem Council, in my view, to raise the question if the tôrâ of  Moses 
relates to the Gentiles at all (see below). 
Ultimately, then, this distinction between the didactic tôrâ and the 
statutory nomos raises the problem of  hermeneutical theory. Peter and the 
Council essentially concluded, “We Jews don’t keep Torah either, not any 
longer.” They had come to understand the tôrâ of  Moses in a new and 
different way, for a new era, inaugurated by the arrival of  Messiah. They 
saw a certain continuity with the tôrâ for it was still the word of  God for 
the new church, while also acknowledging a distinct discontinuity in the 
requirement to “keep the law of  Moses” as demanded by the Pharisees 
(15:1). In other words, this is as simple as the old maxim we use with 
students in beginning hermeneutics; the Old Testament law is God’s word 
for you, not God’s command to you.17	The	Council	moved	quickly	to	affirm	
the tôrâ of  Moses as God’s word for them, as we shall see below. 
3. The Process: The Decision-Making Methods of  the Jerusalem Council  
The	specific	process	of 	decision-making	 is	next	 taken	up	as	an	
example for today’s church. The implication is that, to be truly biblical, 
today’s church will follow a similar procedure in deciding moral and ethical 
questions raised by our new cultural context. The assumption here is 
analogical: today’s church must decide to include LGBTQ believers in the 
church just as the Jerusalem Council decided to include Gentiles. 
Keesmaat describes the process generally as one of  the “doing 
of  theology” in which a narration of  God’s work in the world, Peter’s 
experiences with Cornelius (Acts 10-11), takes center stage.18 Paul and 
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Barnabas follow with stories of  their own about God’s work among the 
Gentiles.	Keesmaat	finds	significance	 in	Paul’s	 reliance	on	a	narrative	of 	
his experiences among the Gentiles, telling of  “all the signs and wonders” 
(Acts 15:12), rather than a critical argument against circumcision as we 
know Paul was capable of  giving (Gal. 5:2-6). Reliance on narrative, on the 
telling of  the stories of  God’s work in the world, becomes a central feature 
of  doing one’s theology. 
Next, Keesmaat observes that James responds to the narratives 
of 	God’s	work	among	the	Gentiles	by	appealing	to	scripture,	specifically	
to	Amos	9:11-12	(Acts	15:16-17).	She	finds	great	significance	in	the	words	
introducing the quote from Amos, καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι τῶν 
προφητῶν, “and with this the words of  the prophets agree” (Acts 15:15, 
obscured by the NRSV’s “this agrees with the words of  the prophets”). 
From this unusual introduction, she concludes, “scripture is seen to agree 
with the contemporary working of  the Spirit, not the other way around” 
(38).	 In	other	words,	 James	 turns	 to	 scripture	 to	 confirm	 the	new	 thing	
that God is doing among the Gentiles. She concludes that James “made 
the remarkable move of  allowing the Old Testament to be illuminated and 
interpreted by the narrative of  God’s activity in the present” in deciding not 
to require circumcision for the Gentile believers. She concludes that, given 
the small number of  texts in the Bible that appear to condemn same-sex 
practices, we might use scripture as James used the book of  Amos in order 
to draw attention away from those texts, as he drew attention away from 
circumcision per se. This will aid us in focusing instead on the experience 
of  the Holy Spirit in the lives of  gays and lesbians in order to produce a new 
reading of  the scriptures as a whole, as James focused on the experiences 
of  the Gentile believers. At the Jerusalem Council, the witness of  the Holy 
Spirit	 in	 believers’	 experience	was	 confirmed	by	 scriptural	witness	 as the 
scripture was reinterpreted in light of  that experience (Keesmaat, 39; emphasis 
hers).
In response to this theological process for decision-making, I need 
first	to	call	attention	to	Keesmaat’s	passing	reference	to	the	idea	that	James	
and the Council might have drawn upon “many scriptural texts that could 
be used to make a case against admitting the Gentiles.”  She notes further 
that other Old Testament passages “insist on the need for circumcision 
for those Gentiles who want to join the community of  Israel” (39). In a 
note, she appeals to the instructions for the institution of  Passover, where 
foreigners or aliens residing with the Israelites are permitted to celebrate 
72     The Asbury Journal    69/2 (2014)
the Passover only after being circumcised (Exodus 12:43-49) and to the 
institution of  circumcision in the covenant with Abraham (Gen. 17).19 But 
these texts are related to the constitution of  national Israel, and none are 
related to the prophetic texts detailing the future day when Gentiles will be 
gathered into the kingdom of  God. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Zechariah 
and others (and perhaps Jonah as well) foretell the ingathering of  Gentiles, 
and none of  these mention circumcision as a prerequisite to their inclusion 
in the kingdom of  God. Clearly a case can be made that the leadership 
in Jerusalem understood better than the Pharisaic party that the Old 
Testament made a clear distinction between (1) foreigners and immigrants 
who	wished	 to	 be	 identified	 as	 Israelites	 and	 to	 join	 the	 Israelite	 ethnic	
people of  God; as distinct from (2) the future day when all nations would 
be drawn to God in faith. This is a possibility not under consideration in 
Keesmaat’s treatment. 
My central criticism, however, of  Keesmaat’s approach has to do 
with the hermeneutical principle involved in the “doing of  theology” in 
this	way.	On	 these	points,	 I	find	an	especially	 close	affinity	between	her	
arguments and those of  Luke Timothy Johnson, and so I take a brief  detour 
to address features of  his important treatment.20 Johnson focuses especially 
on the freedom we have as the children of  God to interpret scripture. As 
Christians, the scripture has authorized us to exercise certain freedoms of  
interpretation. Johnson avers this has two implications for our reading of  
the Bible’s condemnations of  same-sex practices. 
First, Johnson like Keesmaat and others draws attention to the 
relative paucity of  texts in the Bible condemning same-sex practices.21 
In our freedom as interpreters, we should evaluate the number of  such 
condemnations by comparison with the Bible’s extensive and detailed 
condemnation of  economic oppression at virtually every level of  tradition, 
which should leave us with the impression that the Bible’s “off-handed 
rejection	of 	homosexuality	appears	instinctive	and	relatively	unreflective.”22 
My response is to suggest that surely the amount of  material in the Bible 
devoted to economic oppression, among the Old Testament prophets for 
example, is commensurate with the recurring and intractable issue caused 
by social injustice in their society. This was a concern Israel’s prophets 
returned to over and over again, mostly because their audience failed to 
grasp the sinful nature of  their behaviors in light of  the Torah’s instruction. 
By contrast, it might be argued that the Torah’s instructions on sexual 
behavior	were	not	“unreflective,”	as	Johnson	avers,	but	were	not	frequently	
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repeated because they were already widely understood, if  not universally 
obeyed. Furthermore, it might be equally argued that Leviticus 18:22, for 
example,	is	highly	reflective	of 	Israel’s	context	by	issuing	a	call	to	holiness	
of  life in contrast to that of  the Egyptians behind them or the Canaanites 
before them (Lev. 18:2-5 and 24-30). And in comparison to ancient Near 
Eastern attitudes to same-sex practices, an excellent case can be made for 
Israel’s	deep	theological	reflection	in	these	prohibitions.23 
Second, Johnson focuses on our freedom as interpreters to assess 
the contexts of  the Bible’s proscriptions of  homosexuality in light of  general 
warnings against porneia (any form of  sexual immorality), and especially free 
to consider “the grounds on which the texts seem to include homosexuality 
within porneia, namely that it is ‘against nature,’ an abomination offensive 
to God’s created order.”24 He argues that for many, the acceptance of  
homosexuality is an acceptance of  creation itself, and is not a vice that is 
chosen. He asks, “If  this conclusion is correct, what is the hermeneutical 
implication?” I will argue below that in fact, the Apostolic Decree issued by 
the Jerusalem Council warned Gentile believers against porneia, not on the 
grounds that it was “against nature,” but ironically enough, on the grounds 
of  the tôrâ	of 	Moses,	specifically	Leviticus	18.	And	so	it	is	not	correct	that	
the condemnation of  same-sex practices is rooted in creation alone, but is 
also rooted in tôrâ instruction. It should also be observed that Johnson’s 
discussion at this point begs the question of  essentialism, which assumes 
that	homosexuality	itself 	is	a	biological	fixity.25
 
 Returning to Keesmaat’s view of  the process of  decision-making 
in Acts 15, we may raise a few additional questions. First, why should today’s 
readers of  scripture assume we have the freedom to interpret scripture in the 
same way as James and the Jerusalem Council? The problem of  modeling 
our hermeneutical approach after New Testament characters is fraught 
with	 difficulties	 because	 they	 used	 a	 distinctive	 interpretive	model	 from	
the	first-century,	and	we	are	modern	and	postmodern	readers	living	in	the	
wake of  the Enlightenment. We have entire courses of  study and scores of  
secondary literature devoted to reading strategies for Christians reading our 
Bibles. It strikes me as problematic to propose that we have the freedom, 
indeed that we are authorized by the Bible itself, to take freedom and to 
interpret the Bible in the same manner that the New Testament authors 
interpreted the Old Testament. Simply put, we are not New Testament 
authors.  
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Second, I think it is also safe to conclude that Peter, Paul and 
Barnabas, James, and everyone else at the Jerusalem Council, including the 
Pharisaic party, understood that the Gentiles were not eligible to become 
members of  ancient Israel. The Council itself  was not ancient Israel. If  ancient 
Israel	had	still	existed	in	the	first	century	as	an	ethnic	and	political	entity,	
perhaps the requirement of  circumcision would have been an important 
requirement. But the fact is, the Council members understood ancient 
Israel no longer existed. The arrival of  Messiah had changed everything, 
inaugurating a new era of  salvation history, a new “dispensation” for lack 
of 	better	term	that	is	in	fact	still	ongoing.	That	new	era	was	identified	by	
them, as James’ use of  Amos 9 shows, as the period of  Gentile ingathering, 
and therefore their relationship with the tôrâ of  Moses has also changed. 
Moses has not been superseded or discarded as obsolete, except for the 
misconstrued nomistic interpretations, which were really only bastardized 
versions of  the tôrâ	anyway.	In	the	new	era,	Christians	would	come	finally	
to grasp tôrâ as it was intended all along, as useful for teaching, for reproof, 
for correction, and for training in righteousness (2 Tim. 3:16). 
In sum, the process for decision-making at the Jerusalem Council 
did not involve lifting the readers of  the text above and/or against the text; 
experience did not become a trump card over scripture in Acts 15. We may 
speak of  freedom in the “doing of  theology” that considers meanings of  
old texts for new contexts and new situations. But we are not free to make 
experience an arbiter over scripture. Our freedom has distinct boundaries, 
which hermeneutical principles govern, putting limitations on our freedom. 
4. The Parameters: The Conclusion of  the Jerusalem Council
Keesmaat	 turns	 finally	 to	 a	 consideration	 of 	 the	 Council’s	
decision, especially as issued in the Apostolic Decree of  verses 28-29 (and 
compare verse 20). She avers that the issue in this declaration was idolatry, 
and especially everything related to idol worship in the Roman Empire, so 
that “idolatry was at the heart of  the worship that the Gentiles now had to 
abandon” (40). 
While not requiring circumcision for new Gentile believers, the 
apostles decided upon four prohibitions: (1) they could not eat food offered 
to idols, or (2) blood, or (3) meat from strangled animals, and (4) they 
must abstain from sexual immorality. Of  the fourth prohibition, porneia, 
Keesmaat says the following. 
Bill t. arnolD: lessons oF the Jerusalem council    75
[Porneia] had a wide variety of  overtones: adultery, sex for 
hire, temple prostitution. All of  these ways of  behaving 
betray a sexuality rooted in the idolatrous practices of  the 
empire, a sexuality characterized by promiscuity, instant 
gratification,	 and	 consumption.	 Instead,	 the	 Jerusalem	
Council called these Gentile believers to a sexuality rooted 
in commitment and faithfulness, a sexuality that creates 
and builds up community rather than tearing it apart. (Page 
41)
While I do not doubt the Council would have agreed with 
Keesmaat’s assessment that they were calling for sexual faithfulness, one 
wonders if  this is all that we can say about the use of  porneia in this Apostolic 
Decree. New Testament scholarship has expended a good deal of  energy 
trying	to	discern	how	the	Council	arrived	at	these	four	specific	prohibitions.26 
While there can be no doubt they were concerned about idolatry among the 
Gentiles, I have been persuaded by the arguments of  Richard Bauckham 
that these four prohibitions are based concretely on Leviticus 17-18, and 
especially on the recurring phrase “the aliens who reside” (NRSV) among 
the ancient Israelites. The apostles appear to have systematically searched 
these two chapters of  Mosaic tôrâ	and	found	five	occurrences	of 	the	phrase	
(Leviticus 17:8,10,12,13; 18:26). These occurrences explain what non-
Israelite foreigners were obligated to do while living in ancient Israel. And 
the four things prohibited in Leviticus are then repeated in the exact order 
as	listed	in	the	official	version	of 	the	Apostolic	Decree	in	Acts	15:29.27 If  
Bauckham is correct about this association, and I believe he is, then a good 
deal more can and should be said about the use of  porneia in this text.28 
Again, if  Bauckham is correct, then it certainly can no longer 
be asserted, as it often is in popular and pastoral-theological discussions, 
that Acts 15 is an example of  the early church placing aside the Mosaic 
law in order to be inclusive of  new people in the church. Note especially 
the substantiation of  these four prohibitions in the conclusion of  James’ 
speech.  “For in every city, for generations past, Moses has had those who 
proclaim him, for he has been read aloud every sabbath in the synagogues” 
(Acts 15:21). The substantiating nature of  the sentence is marked by the 
conjunction γὰρ,	 “for,	 since.”	 	 James	finds	 support	 for	 the	 prohibitions	
of  the Decree by observing that the Gentiles are surely aware of  Moses, 
and perhaps even vaguely aware of  the content of  Mosaic tôrâ. This is 
an appeal to the perfectly reasonable and fair nature of  imposing these 
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four requirements on the Gentile believers; they would have already been 
familiar with these details. Regardless of  the extent to which the Gentiles 
knew the Mosaic tôrâ, this Apostolic Decree was certainly not placing it 
aside or superseding its authority. On the contrary, the Jerusalem Council 
was turning to the tôrâ	as	a	definitive	and	irreplaceable	authority,	and	seeking	
in its pages guidance on how it relates to the Gentile believers. Indeed, they 
understood Mosaic tôrâ as God’s word for a new day, if  not God’s nomos to 
be obeyed in every particular. Bauckham’s conclusion is noteworthy. 
Acts 15:16-18 establishes that Gentiles do not have to 
become Jews in order to belong to the eschatological 
people of  God, and so authorizes James’ decision 
announced in Acts 15:19. The proviso in Acts 15:20 
is	 not	 an	 arbitrary	 qualification	 of 	 this	 decision,	 but	
itself  follows, with exegetical logic, from Acts 15:16-
18. If  Gentile Christians are the Gentiles to whom the 
prophecies	conflated	in	Acts	15:16-18	refer,	then	they	are	
also the Gentiles of  Jer. 12:16; Zech. 2:11/15 [Eng. 2:11; 
Heb 2:15], and therefore the part of  the Law of  Moses 
which applies to them is Leviticus 17-18.29 
The apostles sought and found principles in tôrâ for a new formulation of  
Christian sexual ethics. Ironically, they were not overturning Mosaic tôrâ but 
relying on it for guidance. Again, Bauckham: “Just as the conversion of  the 
Gentiles has been made known by God in prophecy from long ago (Acts 
15:17b-18 = Isa. 45:21), so the laws which apply to them are not novel 
inventions, but have been read out in the synagogues in every city from 
ancient times” (Acts 15.21).30  It could even be said, based on Acts 15:21, 
that the Apostolic Decree shows “the law of  Moses continues to be valid 
for Jews as Jews and for Gentiles as Gentiles.”31 
Thus	 the	 specific	 understanding	 of 	 porneia in the Decree, and 
one to be required of  the new Gentile believers, was more than a general 
condemnation of  idolatry by calling for sexual purity that shuns the 
promiscuity of  the Roman Empire (Keesmaat). In a concrete way, the 
Apostles were relying on the sexual purity laws of  Leviticus 18 to articulate 
a minimum sexual ethic. In this way, the Apostolic Decree is more relevant 
to our debate than merely a means of  distancing the Gentiles from 
promiscuous Roman practices. The foundation of  the new Christian ethic 
for Gentiles was, in fact, Mosaic tôrâ. 
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5. Conclusions: The Lessons of  the Jerusalem Council
What then can we say about the relevance of  the Jerusalem Council 
for the church’s contemporary debate over human sexuality? First, we need 
to acknowledge that the Old Testament data on human sexuality cannot be 
swept away or dismissed as irrelevant to our current debate. Many attempt 
to exclude the proscriptions of  Lev 18:22 and 20:13 as statutory nomos, and 
therefore irrelevant for today’s Christians. But their value as didactic tôrâ 
cannot be jettisoned or cut from our canon; these texts mean something, 
and our debates must deal with all the biblical data in one way or another. If  
it is true that the Apostolic Decree of  Acts 15:28-29 was dependent upon 
Leviticus	 17-18,	 then	 the	first	Christians	 at	 the	 Jerusalem	Council	 relied	
on the didactic tôrâ to devise a new Christian sexual ethic for Gentiles. As 
Mosaic tôrâ, these data cannot be ignored. 
This	first	conclusion	of 	our	investigation	relates	to	the	assessment	
of  Christopher R. Seitz about the last forty years of  debate over same-sex 
practices.	Seitz	identifies	three	separate	and	distinct	phases	in	the	church’s	
understanding of  scriptural statements on same-sex practices.32 (1) By 
reevaluating the exegetical details, scholars argued the texts condemning 
same-sex practices had been misunderstood for centuries, concluding they 
were condemning rape, pederasty, or cult prostitution. Since the biblical 
authors had no context in which to evaluate faithful, same-sex commitment, 
these texts were deemed irrelevant for our context. This phase was marked 
by	confidence	that	we	had	finally	come	to	understand	the	texts,	and	we	were	
able now to correct the misreadings of  the past. Although one occasionally 
still hears such arguments in the popular-level discussions, this approach to 
same-sex references in scripture is now largely abandoned in the scholarship, 
because it is clearly eisegetical in its assumptions. (2) Next, in light of  the 
paucity of  biblical statements about same-sex practices, it was argued that 
scripture offers little to go on, and provides instead a rough guide for 
decision-making in the church. The Jerusalem Council’s decision in Acts 15 
has	played	a	significant	role	in	this	phase.	The	first-century	church	in	Acts	
10-15 in the decision to include Gentiles is said to be analogous to today’s 
debates over acceptance of  LGBTQ Christians in all aspects of  church 
life, including the blessing of  same-sex marriages, ordination, and what 
is usually termed “full inclusion.” My investigation of  the hermeneutical 
principles	used	in	this	approach	raises	significant	challenges	to	the	analogy	
as	an	interpretive	model,	especially	as	sufficient	to	overturn	scriptural	and	
traditional mandate. (3) Finally, in the third phase, some argue the scriptural 
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texts prohibiting same-sex practices are clear but irrelevant to our current 
debate. The argument is that monogamous, faithful homosexuality, which 
Luke Timothy Johnson calls “homosexual holiness,” was simply not known 
in antiquity.33 We cannot expect the authors of  the Bible to sanction and 
bless such relationships or to speak to our world today on this issue because 
it was developmentally beyond the range of  their religious progression. 
Seitz astutely observes that the trajectory of  these three phases is 
paralleled by a reduction of  the church’s scripture to “a book of  religious 
development, from one Testament to the next,” and ultimately, to our 
enlightened modern times.34 The Bible loses all canonical authority in such 
an approach, which reduces scripture merely to a resource for thinking 
about doctrine and practice. It essentially reduces scripture to an historical 
document about God’s revelation in the past instead of  an inspired canon 
as	the	foundation	for	our	theological	reflection.35 
The second conclusion of  our analysis raises a question about 
the way Keesmaat and others refer to the “process” of  decision-making, as 
though mimicking a process in the early church is an appropriate model for 
today. The method of  exegesis used by the authors of  the New Testament 
is not one we can or should model in our own reading of  scripture.36 
Similarly, the process of  decision-making used in the early church, although 
perhaps instructive on a number of  levels, is not an authoritative or inspired 
model for the church’s decision-making today. The process of  exegesis is 
not the object of  inspiration. But the result of  ancient exegesis as written 
and preserved in the canon is the object of  inspiration. We are not free 
to	 interpret	 the	 Bible	 the	 way	 first-century	 Christians	 exegeted	 the	Old	
Testament. Our freedom in Christ has distinct and liberating elements 
for interpreting God’s truth for our world. But we have hermeneutical 
boundaries around that freedom, which establish equally distinct limitations 
to our freedom when it comes to overturning longstanding scriptural and 
traditional precedents. 
A	possible	third	conclusion	to	be	explored	is	the	definitive	nature	
of 	 conciliar	 decisions.	 Further	 investigation	 and	 theological	 reflection	 is	
needed to evaluate the degree to which formal, conciliar decisions made 
by the church can be reevaluated or reconsidered by later groups. While 
equally	difficult	decisions	were	reached	by	later	ecumenical	church	councils,	
especially	those	of 	Nicaea	(325	AD)	and	Chalcedon	(451	AD),	I	find	little	
to validate the idea that subsequent generations of  believers were free to 
return and reconsider those decisions. Indeed, in these cases it appears 
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the saints moved forward without coming back time and time again to 
reconsider the question, opening old wounds and challenging the previous 
decisions. Perhaps we need an understanding of  such church councils 
that agrees that once a controversy has been thoroughly debated, all sides 
have been heard, and the saints have decided, there comes a time to move 
forward in the work of  the church. 
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